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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
HEARING NOT REQUIRED PRIOR TO REDUCTION OF
SOCIAL SECURITY SURVIVORS' BENEFITS
Frost v. Weinberger
Whenever the government acts to deprive an individual of life,
liberty, or property, due process requires that the proposed depri-
vation be neither arbitrary nor capricious.' Due process is flexible
enough, however, to fit the needs of a wide variety of cases.2 To
achieve this flexibility, the procedural requirements of each situa-
tion will be determined by a balancing process in which the court
will weigh the interests of the individual against those of the gov-
ernment.3 At a minimum, the individual is generally entitled to
notice and a hearing prior to governmental deprivation of any
protected interest,4 with the court applying the balancing test to
determine the specific nature of the hearing. Nevertheless, in a
small number of cases, characterized as "rare and extraordinary,
5
the Supreme Court has held that a prior hearing may be constitu-
' Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (due process attack rejected since federal
statute not arbitrary and capricious); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330,
354 (1935) (due process attack sustained since statute defined pension eligibility arbitrarily);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-39 (1934) (due process attack rejected since statute
fixing milk prices not arbitrary and capricious).
2 In Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), the Supreme Court
noted that "consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set
of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action." Id. at 895. Accord, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-78 (1975) (very informal
procedure prior to 10-day suspension of high school student held adequate).
' Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1971) (licensee's interest in avoiding suspension
of driver's license balanced against government's interest in protecting claimants from the
possibility of unrecoverable judgments); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970)
(welfare recipient's interest in a hearing prior to termination of payments balanced against
governments interest in preserving fiscal and administrative resources); Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (com-
plaining organization's interest in not being designated "Communist" balanced against the
government's interest in national security). See generally Note, Specifying the Procedures Re-
quired by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510
(1975).
' Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971), the Court remarked:
[The] root requirement [of due process is] that an individual be given an opportu-
nity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest, except
for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that
justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.
Id. at 379 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972).
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tionally denied.6 In these instances, curtailment of the individual's
due process protection has been justified by the presence of "a
countervailing state interest of overriding significance."'7  It is
against this background that the Second Circuit, in Frost v. Wein-
berger,8 held that due process does not require a hearing prior to
reduction of Social Security survivors' benefits.'
The plaintiffs in Frost" were the spouse and dependent chil-
dren of Charles Frost, Jr., who had died fully insured under the
Social Security Act." t Since his death, plaintiffs had filed for and
received benefit payments1 2 amounting to the statutory aggregate
maximum. 13 In addition, another woman claiming to be the
mother of Frost's illegitimate children1 4 filed for benefits on their
behalf. Although this claim was initially denied pursuant to a provi-
sion barring payments to illegitimates where benefits to other
claimants equaled or exceeded the statutory maximum,'- the Social
Security Administration (SSA) began making payments to Frost's
6Set, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 549 (1950) (seizure of
mislabeled vitamins); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (appointment of conservator
for bank); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (mandatory price regulations in
wartime); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of allegedly
contaminated food).
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
515 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'g 375 F. Supp. 1312 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). The unanimous
opinion was authored by Judge Friendly. The other members of the panel were Judges
Waterman and Gurfein.
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
" The suit was brought as a class action pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23, with the named
plaintiffs representing all other persons entitled to survivors' benefits whose benefits have
been or may be reduced without the benefit of a prior hearing. 375 F. Supp. at 1316.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 414(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)-(2), (g)(1) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974), which entitles
the children and wife of an insured wage earner to receive survivors' benefits.
'" Although all beneficiaries are entitled to a specified monthly stipend based upon the
decedent's average earnings, the total payments to the survivors of a single decedent may not
exceed a statutory maximum which is also a function of the decedent's average earnings.
When total benefits would otherwise exceed this maximum, each beneficiary's entitlement is
decreased to reduce the aggregate to the prescribed level. 42 U.S.C. § 403 (1970), as amended,
(Supp. IV, 1974).
The constitutionality of the statutory maximum figure was not at issue in Frost. The
validity of a statutory maximum in an analogous situation has, however, been upheld by the
Supreme Court. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court reviewed a
Maryland statute which placed a ceiling on the total amount of benefits each family may
receive under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.
(1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974), and held that such a limitation does not violate the
equal protection clause. 397 U.S. at 483-87.
"4 Several years before his death, Frost had left his wife and cohabited with one Lola
Coolidge. In support of her claim that Frost had fathered her two illegitimate children,
Coolidge produced birth certificates naming Frost as the father. 515 F.2d at 60 n.6.
i5 42 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970) provides that where the inclusion of benefits to illegitimate
children pursuant to id. § 416(h)(3) would raise the total benefits to a level above the
statutory maximum, see note 13 supra, illegitimates' benefits should be reduced before any
reduction of other beneficiaries' payments is made. Under this scheme, illegitimates could
receive no more than the difference between the benefits being paid to the decedent's
legitimate family and the statutory maximum.
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illegitimate offspring after the provision was subsequently held
unconstitutional.' 6 Since Mrs. Frost and her children had been
receiving the statutory maximum, their benefits were necessarily
reduced to provide funds for the newly entitled claimants.
SSA procedure for adjusting payments provided the plaintiffs
with several opportunities to contest the reduction in benefits. 17
While plaintiffs were permitted to submit evidence prior to the
actual reduction,' 8 no opportunity for a hearing was provided until
after the adjustment had become effective.' 9 Mrs. Frost, claiming
16 In Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md.) (three-judge court), aff'd mem.,
409 U.S. 1069 (1972), a class action, plaintiffs asserted that the arbitrary denial of benefits to
illegitimate children in favor of legitimate offspring was discriminatory. 346 F. Supp. at
1229. The court held the provision "to be unconstitutional because it violates the due process
guarantee set forth in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Id. at 1237.
Prior to a 1965 amendment, the only children entitled to survivors' benefits were
legitimate or adopted children, children who could inherit from the insured under the law
of the state in which the insured was domiciled, and children who would otherwise be
entitled except for the fact that the decedent's marriage ceremony was invalid due to
specified legal impediments. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(3), 416(h)(2)(A)-(B) (1970). A new subdivi-
sion, added in 1965, Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 339(a), 79
Stat. 409 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i) (1970)), provides that illegitimate children
are entitled to benefits if the deceased
(I) had acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his son or daughter,
(II) had been decreed by a court to be the father of the applicant, or
(III) had been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the applicant
because the applicant was his son or daughter ....
Such acknowledgment, decree, or order must be made before the death of the insured. 42
U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i) (1970). Alternatively, id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii), also added in 1965, Social
Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 339(a), 79 Stat. 409, entitles a child to
benefits if satisfactory evidence establishes that the decedent was the child's father and that,
at the time of the decedent's death, he was living with or contributing to the child's support.
Lucas v. HEW, 390 F. Supp. 1310 (D.R.I. 1975), prob. juris. noted, 44 U.S.LW. 3200 (U.S.
Oct. 6, 1975) (No. 75-88).
7The SSA adjustment procedure provided for: (1) notification and explanation of the
action to be taken; (2) a 45-day waiting period before any reduction; and (3) an opportunity
for the beneficiary, within 30 days of the time he receives notification, to both inform the
SSA district office of his intention to contest the adjustment and present any proof which
would substantiate his position. If the district office made no change in its determination, the
reasons for its decision, along with any proof submitted by the beneficiary, would then be
forwarded to the reviewing office. If the reviewing office reached a conclusion that the
beneficiary's proof cast no doubt upon the original determination, the benefits would be
adjusted downward accordingly, and the beneficiary informed of his right to further appeal.
The beneficiary could then petition for reconsideration of the adjustment. Such a
petition would be handled by the reconsideration branch, which would review the record
and summarize the facts and the law of the decision. If the reconsideration branch upheld
the adjustment, the beneficiary would then be entitled to an evidentiary hearing before an
administrative law judge. From an adverse ruling, appeal could be taken to the appeals
council, and, as a last resort, judicial review would be available. SSA, SOCIAL SECURTY
CLAIMS MANUAL (1972-1973), discussed in Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57, 59-60 (2d Cir.
1975).
'"See note 17 supra. Mrs. Frost asserted two grounds for her objection to the SSA's
original determination: First, she claimed that Mr. Frost had become impotent in early 1966
and could not, therefore, have fathered the illegitimate children; and second, she claimed
that the illegitimates were not entitled to benefits because Frost had not consented in writing
to being named the father on their birth certificates. 515 F.2d at 60 n.6. The circumstances
under which illegitimates are entitled to benefits are set forth in note 16 supra.
"
0 See note 17 supra.
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that her benefits had been reduced without due process, com-
menced an action in federal district court to have the SSA proce-
dures declared unconstitutional. Although the district court held
for plaintiffs, 20 the Second Circuit reversed.21
In upholding the constitutionality of the SSA procedure, the
Second Circuit was compelled to distinguish Frost from Goldberg v.
Kelly, 22 where the Supreme Court held that due process requires
that a welfare recipient be afforded a hearing prior to termination
of benefits. In Goldberg, after a preliminary finding that welfare
benefits constituted a protected property interest,23 the Court bal-
anced the opposing interests to determine what procedures were
required by due process and concluded that the Government's
interest in terminating the benefits of unqualified welfare reci-
pients was outweighed by the disaster which could befall an eligible
recipient whose benefits were erroneously terminated. 24 The Gold-
berg Court thus rejected the Government's contention that the
situation before it fell within the narrow class of exceptional cases
in which overwhelming governmental interests will permit suspen-
sion of the traditional prior hearing rule. Although it recognized
the Government's valid interest in avoiding fiscal and administra-
tive waste, the Court concentrated upon the position of the welfare
recipient, stating that "termination of aid pending resolution of a
controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the
very means by which to live while he waits. '25
Faced with Goldberg, ostensibly a controlling precedent, the
Second Circuit began by noting a number of factual distinctions to
justify the contrary result it reached in Frost.26 Looking first to the
20 375 F. Supp. at 1326-27. In finding the SSA procedure unconstitutional, the district
court relied heavily upon Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 22-25 infra.
21 515 F.2d at 68. The Second Circuit's decision was made contingent upon SSA
compliance with two requirements: First, all Social Security recipients faced with possible
reduction of benefits must be allowed full access to all files relevant to the SSA's preliminary
determination; and second, the SSA must schedule all postreduction hearings, when re-
quested, "with all feasible speed." Id.
22 397 U.S. 254 (1970), discussed in Cook & McKenna, Due Process in the Administration of
the Social Security Program, 33 FED. B.J. 168 (1974); Meyerhoff & Mishkin, Application of
Goldberg v. Kelly Hearing Requirements to Termination of Social Security Benefits, 26 STAN. L.
REv. 549 (1974); and Note, Procedural Due Process and the Termination of Social Security Disability
Benefits, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1263 (1973).
23 397 U.S. at 261-62.
24 Id. at 265-71.
2 Id. at 264 (emphasis in original).
26 Before reaching the merits, Judge Friendly disposed of several procedural questions.
The court was initially confronted with whether it even had federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Since no individual claim exceeded the requisite $10,000
amount in controversy, Judge Friendly thought it unclear under Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S.
332 (1969), whether the claims of the class could be aggregated to satisfy this jurisdictional
predicate. 515 F.2d at 61-62. Rather than resolve this question, the court based its finding of
[Vol. 50:255
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private interests, deemed crucial in Goldberg, the Frost court exam-
ined the nature of the Social Security benefits there involved.27
Admittedly, SSA survivors' benefits are not awarded on the basis of
need, nor were they the last available source of income to the
Frosts. In fact, the Second Circuit suggested that the family would
still have recourse to welfare assistance.28 Unlike the plaintiffs in
Goldberg, therefore, there was no danger that Mrs. Frost and her
children, potential victims of an erroneous prehearing determina-
jurisdiction upon 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970), which grants to federal courts original jurisdiction
to entertain actions in which the plaintiff is seeking to compel a federal agency to perform a
duty owed to him. 515 F.2d at 62. Section 1361 was similarly used as a basis for jurisdiction
in Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1125-26 (10th Cir. 1973); Mattern v. Weinberger,
377 F. Supp. 906, 914 (E.D. Pa. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 519 F.2d 150
(3d Cir. 1975),petition for cert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1975) (No. 75-649); and
Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960, 967-68 (D. Hawaii 1974), aff'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 2175
(9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1975).
The Second Circuit next affirmed the district court's finding that as a class action the
controversy was not mooted by the postreduction hearing eventually provided Mrs. Frost.
The SSA argued that since Mrs. Frost had already been granted a postreduction hearing and
the administrative law judge had agreed with the SSA's previous decision, a controversy no
longer existed. 515 F.2d at 62. The Second Circuit rejected this argument on two grounds.
After observing that Mrs. Frost was still entitled to an administrative appeal pursuant to the
SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS MANUAL, see note 17 supra, the court concluded that should Mrs.
Frost be entitled to a prereduction hearing, notwithstanding the administrative law judge's
adverse determination, she would still be eligible for a refund of the benefits withheld
pending the outcome of her administrative appeal. 515 F.2d at 62.
Not content to base its finding on such a narrow ground, the court approached the issue
of mootness as it applied to the class rather than the individual plaintiffs. Id. at 62-64. The
peculiar procedural posture of the case, however, gave the court some difficulty. The district
court did not rule on Frost's motion for class action status until after the postreduction
hearing. 375 F. Supp. at 1318-19. Relying on language in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402
(1975), where the Supreme Court reiterated the general rule that the named plaintiffs must
have a live controversy at the time the class action certification is granted, id. at 402-03, the
SSA contended that because class status did not attach until after the adverse ruling following
the hearing the case before the court was already moot. 515 F.2d at 63-64.
In Sosna, however, it was noted that in certain cases "the controversy involving the
named plaintiffs is such that it becomes moot as to them before the district court can
reasonably be expected to rule on a [class action] certification motion." 419 U.S. at 402 n. 11.
Since the particular issue at hand might otherwise "evade review," the Supreme Court
indicated that courts have discretion to permit class action certification to relate back to the
time of the filing of the complaint. Id. In Frost, as Judge Friendly pointed out, where the
merits of the case would never be reached unless either the class action certification related
back to the filing of the complaint or the postreduction hearing was postponed until after
the district court made the class action determination, the factual situation fit within the
discretionary area left open by Soma. 515 F.2d at 64.
27 The threshold question was whether recipients of Social Security survivors' benefits
had a property interest in their payments which would entitle them to due process. The
Supreme Court had held in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), that Social Security
old age benefits did not constitute "an accrued property right." Id. at 608. After the Goldberg
decision, however, which held that welfare payments were "statutory entitlements" or "im-
portant rights" with respect to which due process cannot be suspended offhandedly, 397
U.S. at 262, for the purposes of due process subsequent federal decisions have accorded
Social Security benefits the same property status accorded welfare payments. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Richardson, 454 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1972); Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp.
960, 969-72 (D. Hawaii 1974), aft'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 2175 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1975). See also Note,
Procedural Due Process and the Termination of Social Security Disability Benefits, 46 S. CAL. L. REv.
1263 (1973).
28 515 F.2d at 66-67.
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tion, would be left utterly destitute. Moreover, the court noted that
while the plaintiffs in Goldberg faced termination of assistance, the
Frost plaintiffs suffered only a reduction of benefits. Although this
reduction was sizeable,2 9 the distinction tended to dilute the
urgency of the plaintiffs' claim. 30
Turning to the Government's interest, the Second Circuit
noted that the SSA had a substantial and valid interest in protect-
ing its financial resources from unreasonable depletion.31 Judge
Friendly, speaking for the court, observed that if the SSA were
required to pay benefits to both the plaintiffs and the illegitimate
children until an evidentiary hearing was held, it is certain that
some erroneous payments would be made.32 In Goldberg, on the
2" Survivors' benefits to the Frosts were reduced by 40%, from $477.90 to $287.10 per
month. Id. at 67.
30 The district court reasoned that, realistically, Social Security beneficiaries have as
great a need for their payments as welfare recipients. The court cited an SSA study which
reported "that two-thirds of all beneficiaries receiving survivors' benefits depend upon their
monthly payments as 'the major source of income.'" 375 F. Supp. at 1322, quoting E.
PALMORE, G. STANLEY & R. CORMIER, WIDOWS WITH CHILDREN UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY 15
(1966). In line with this report, in Meyerhoff & Mishkin, Application of Goldberg v. Kelly
Hearing Requirements to Termination of Social Security Benifits, 26 STAN. L. REV. 549, 564 (1974),
the authors noted that "[r]eports on the economic situation of beneficiaries of survivors'
insurance . . . reveal a high degree of poverty among those individuals."
According to the district court, the 40% reduction in benefits placed Mrs. Frost's income
marginally above the poverty threshold established by the SSA. 375 F. Supp. at 1322, citing
Soc. SEC. BULL., ANN. STATISTICAL SUPP. table 7, at 31 (1971). While the Second Circuit was
aware that the reduction could produce harsh consequences, the availability of other gov-
ernmental assistance was deemed sufficient to overcome the possibility that an erroneous
adjustment would be made because no prior hearing was conducted. 515 F.2d at 67.
Notably, in Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Va. 1973), aff'd per curiam,
493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 1104 (1975), the district court held that
Social Security disability beneficiaries are entitled to a hearing prior to termination of
payments. 361 F. Supp. at 528. With regard to the question of need, the court relied upon
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), to support its position that "the Supreme Court
specifically rejected a narrow reading of Goldberg that would limit the due process require-
ment of a prior hearing to cases involving necessities." 361 F. Supp. at 524.
" In a persuasive article, coauthored by the Director of the Bureau of Hearings and
Appeals, HEW-SSA, and the Director of the Bureau of Retirement and Survivors' Insurance,
HEW-SSA, the SSA adjustment procedures, outlined in note 17 supra, were defended. Cook
& McKenna, Due Process in the Administration of the Social Security Program. 33 FED. B.J. 168
(1974). The argument presented there was two pronged. The authors' primary rationale for
continuing present procedure was simply that "it is accomplishing the desired results." Id. at
178. The authors asserted that the current program combines "preinformation ... to keep
the average person informed" with "delay in adjustment of benefits in overpayment and
adverse claims situations permit[ting] the individual to present any rebuttal or mitigating
evidence" prior to reduction or termination. Id.
The second argument involved the prohibitive expense of providing predetermination
hearings in every case. Based upon 1970 costs, the authors projected that the expense of
implementing full Goldberg hearings could approach $1 billion. Id. The authors warned:
[W]e must guard against procedures and policies that go beyond what is needed to
insure the integrity of the program ....
We take very seriously the fact that every dollar spent on administration
comes from the contributions people have made for their security.
Id. at 184, quoting SSA, THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (1965).
32 515 F.2d at 67.
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other hand, the possibility existed that interim payments made to a
questionable recipient would, in fact, be valid. Therefore, in Frost,
the Government was faced with certain fiscal waste, while in
Goldberg only the possibility of waste was present. The court also
emphasized the SSA's contention that the expense of a prereduc-
tion hearing would constitute an unreasonable administrative bur-
den. The Frost court noted that the hearing mandated by Goldberg
did not require a full trial-type proceeding"3 and that the evidence
necessary to make the required factual determination there was
readily available to both the Government and the welfare recipient.
While the Second Circuit could have required that a Goldberg hear-
ing be conducted, the issues to be resolved in Frost would be far
more complex than those involved in determining welfare eligibil-
ity. The factual question in Frost was whether Mr. Frost was the
father of the illegitimate children. Such a hearing would not only
require the presence of witnesses who may live in remote areas, but
would also generally promise to be more complex, time consuming,
and expensive.3 4
Although it may be conceded that in Frost the private interests
were less compelling and the governmental interests stronger than
in Goldberg, it is submitted that the court would not have been
justified in upholding the SSA procedure for these reasons alone.
The mere fact that governmental interests outweigh private inter-
ests is insufficient grounds to dispense with a prior hearing. As the
Supreme Court stated in Boddie v. Connecticut,35
The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can
vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved
and the nature of the subsequent proceedings. That the hearing
required by due process is subject to waiver, and is not fixed in
form does not affect its root requirement that an individual be
given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any
significant property interest, except for extraordinary situations
where some valid governmental interest is at stake .... In short,
"within the limits of practicability,".., a State must afford to all
individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard . . .36
33 The hearing mandated by Goldberg is not required to "take the form of a judicial or
quasi-judicial trial." 397 U.S. at 266. Nevertheless, the Court ordered that the hearing
permit the welfare recipient to appear personally, to present witnesses, and to confront
adverse witnesses orally. Id. at 267-68. According to the Court, the recipient should also be
allowed to have counsel present, although counsel need not be provided. Id. at 270. Finally,
although no formal opinion is necessary, the Court stated that the official who renders the
decision must state his reasons. Id. at 271. It is noteworthy that Professor Davis has suggested
that the requirements set forth belie the Court's claim that it has mandated something less
than a trial-type hearing. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT § 7.07, at 169-70 (3d ed.
1972).
14 515 F.2d at 67.
35401 U.S. 371 (1971).
Ul Id. at 378-79 (citation omitted) (emphasis in part added) (footnotes omitted). Simi-
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Perhaps recognizing that more than a mere balancing of inter-
ests was involved, the Second Circuit analogized to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy37 to justify the absence of a
prereduction hearing. In Arnett, a federal employee claimed that
dismissal without a prior hearing violated his due process rights.
The procedures afforded the employee were similar to those in
Frost in that the plaintiff was permitted to submit evidence prior to
the governmental action, but was denied a full hearing until after
his dismissal.38 A divided Court upheld the dismissal procedure.
Significantly, the Second Circuit focused on Justice Powell's con-
curring opinion in Arnett39 to justify its holding in Frost.
In validating the Arnett procedure Justice Powell also began by
drawing factual distinctions with Goldberg. Since a discharged fed-
eral employee is not financially destitute and his federal employ-
ment is not his last available source of income, an erroneous pre-
hearing determination would not have the disastrous effects of an
erroneous prehearing termination of welfare benefits. Justice Pow-
ell also observed that a discharged federal employee would still be
eligible to receive welfare payments. 40 The Powell opinion further
noted that the Arnett predismissal procedures, including notice and
a right to respond orally and in writing, "minimize the risk of error
in the initial [determination]."41 Since the SSA procedure in Frost
essentially parallels the termination procedure in Arnett, welfare is
still available to the aggrieved beneficiary, and the reduction of
survivors' benefits does not necessarily deprive the beneficiary of all
his income; Powell's determination that the procedure in Arnett was
fundamentally fair adds support to the Second Circuit's adjudica-
tion.
Finally, and most importantly, Justice Powell distinguished the
Government's interests in Arnett from those "rather ordinary" gov-
ernmental interests deemed by the Court in Goldberg to be in-
larly, in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the Court stated that prior notice and hearing
are required in all but "emergency situations." Id. at 542. This position was again restated in
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972).
37 416 U.S. 134 (1974), discuzssed in The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 41,
83 (1974).
3' The procedure upheld in Arnett provided that the employee be given the reasons for
his contemplated dismissal at least 30 days prior to the discharge. Permitted to rebut the
charges both orally and in writing, the employee could appear personally to discuss the
matter with the official who would make the final decision. Following exhaustion of these
procedures, and after the employee had been dismissed, he would then be entitled to a full
hearing after which reinstatement with. full backpay would be forthcoming if he were
successful. 5 U.S.C. § 7501(b) (1970), discussed in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 140-41,
170 (1974).
39 416 U.S. at 164-71 (Powell, J., concurring).4 0 Id. at 169.4 1 Id. at 170.
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sufficient to deprive a person of a prior hearing. In Arnett, in
addition to the Government's concern for maintaining fiscal and
administrative resources, there was "substantial interest in main-
taining the efficiency and discipline of its own employees. 42 In
concluding that due process did not mandate a prior hearing it
would appear that Justice Powell found that this governmental
interest, when coupled with a finding that the established proce-
dures provided a reasonable degree of fairness, was of "overriding
significance" when balanced against private interests which cannot
be characterized as desperate. While Frost did not involve the ef-
ficiency of governmental employees, it did contain an additional
factor which the Second Circuit seems to have considered tor be of
equivalent magnitude: the interest of the illegitimate children to
receive benefits without undue delay. In fact, the Second Circuit
actually found that the interests of the illegitimate children "coun-
terbalanced" those of the plaintiffs. 43 In this light, the court's hold-
ing seems justified since, when the substantial interests of the Gov-
ernment are considered together with the important interests of the
illegitimate children, interests of "overriding significance" out-
weighing the needs of the plaintiffs become apparent. The Second
Circuit's holding in Frost, therefore, may be justified as an exten-
sion of the "extraordinary situations '44 exception to the general
rule that governmental deprivation of a protected property interest
requires prior notice and hearing.
The problem with the Frost reasoning, however, arises from
the court's substantial reliance on Justice Powell's concurring opin-
ion in Arnett. Justice Powell expressed a view with which only
Justices Blackmun and White agreed.45 His conclusion, therefore,
that the Government's interest in maintaining the efficiency of its
employees was an opposing interest of "overriding significance"
was shared by only two other members of the Court. The Second
Circuit failed to give adequate recognition to the fact that the
dismissal procedures in Arnett were in fact upheld only because
Justice Rehnquist, in a plurality opinion in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Stewart joined, also, but for reasons unrelated
to the Government's interest in efficiency, found that the employee
42 Id. at 168 n.4.
13515 F.2d at 67.
USee note 6 and accompanying text supra.
4 Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Powell's concurring opinion. 416 U.S. at 164-71
(Powell, J., concurring). Justice White, who authored a separate opinion, id. at 171-203
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), agreed that a prior hearing was not
required. Justice White found the procedure to be unconstitutional, however, because the
same official who initiated the plaintiffs dismissal also made the preliminary finding that the
termination was valid. Id. at 196-203.
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was not entitled to a predismissal hearing.4 6 In addition, the Frost
court failed to consider that Justice Marshall, joined by Justices
Brennan and Douglas, emphatically rejected Justice Powell's view,
labeled the Government's interest in efficiency "entirely unconvinc-
ing,"47 and deemed it one not amounting to the kind of opposing
interest of "overriding significance" required to dispense with a
prior hearing.
The Second Circuit's reliance upon the Powell opinion be-
comes even more tenuous when viewed in the light of Goss it.
Lopez,48 wherein the Court recently restated its position on due
process protection. Justice White, writing for the majority, em-
phasized that the minimum requirement of due process continues
to be prior notice and hearing.41 In fact, when considering the
constitutionality of SSA procedures which permitted recoupment
of excessive disability benefits without a prior hearing, the Third
Circuit in Mattern v. Weinberger50 specifically declined to follow the
Frost rationale. In finding the recoupment procedures constitution-
ally deficient, the Mattern court devoted a portion of its opinion to
criticizing reliance on a view espoused by only three members of
the Court.51
It is suggested that the better view of the Frost holding lies in
the Second Circuit's recognition that the presence of the new
claimants made the SSA's role there clearly distinguishable from
the Government's position in both Goldberg and Arnett. In Frost, the
46 In Arnelt, six Justices agreed that a predismissal hearing was not required, but for
differing reasons. The three Justices joining in the plurality opinion rested their decision
upon a finding that the plaintiff did not have a property interest which was protected by due
process requirements. Id. at 136-64. Justices Powell, Blackmun, and White concluded that
although due process did attach, it did not require a pretermination hearing. See note 45
supra.
47 416 U.S. at 224 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48 419 U.S. 565 (1975). In Goss the Court held that a public high school student is
entitled to notice and a limited hearing prior to a 10-day suspension from school.
4 Id. at 579.
50 519 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Oct. 31,
1975) (No. 75-649).
' Id. it 163-64. The Third Circuit also chided the Frost opinion for failing to mention
North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); and Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971),
wherein the Supreme Court seems to indicate that a prior hearing is required whenever the
impact of the deprivation is more than de minimis. In support of its position that the Frost
court erred in relying upon the "severity of impact" and "overriding significance" tests
espoused by Justice Powell, the Third Circuit, 519 F.2d at 164, pointed to Williams v.
Weinberger, 494 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir. 1974), petitionfor cert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3009 (U.S. Aug.
29, 1974) (No. 74-205), and Eldridge v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 419 U.S. 1104 (1975). In these two recent cases, both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
concluded that due process requires that a hearing be held prior to termination of Social
Security disability payments.
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SSA's only function was to determine the relative rights of two
competing claimants to the same fund. Since the SSA had no
financial stake in the outcome, the court apparently reasoned that
the probability of a fair prehearing determination was greater than
in Goldberg or Arnett where the outcome would affect total govern-
ment disbursements. 52 As the Third Circuit, discussing the Frost
opinion, noted in Mattern:
[T]he controversy was not so much one between the Government
and beneficiaries as between two groups of beneficiaries, with the
Social Security Administration having "no financial stake" and
being "totally disinterested as between the two sets of claim-
ants."5
3
In light of both the Supreme Court's continued emphasis on
the importance of prior notice and hearing, and the extreme fac-
tual variation between Frost and cases where the Court has allowed
suspension of these fundamental protections,54 it is arguable that
the Second Circuit's decision to dispense with the root due process
requirement of a prior hearing demands greater justification than
that provided by an opinion apparently shared by less than a
majority of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, although prior
notice and hearing are generally its basic elements, it would be
erroneous to equate due process with an absolute requirement that
all deprivations of protected rights be preceded by a hearing. The
purpose of due process is to insure "fundamentally fair proce-
dures ' 55 when government acts to the detriment of the individual.
The more justifiable view of Frost is that the Second Circuit, finding
that the SSA procedures provided the plaintiffs with reasonable
protection and that the opposing interests were of sufficient impor-
tance, decided that the challenged procedures secured fundamen-
tal fairness and that no more was necessary to comply with both the
spirit and the flexible requirements of due process.
Benjamin Mahler
'
2 See 515 F.2d at 68.
53 519 F.2d at 163.
'4 See note 6 supra.
55 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
Editor's Note. While this note was being. printed, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Fourth Circuit in Eldridge v. Weinberger, discussed in notes 30 & 51, and held
that no hearing is required prior to termination of Social Security disability benefits. 44
U.S.L.W. 4224 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976). This decision, concerning a procedural due process
question closely analogous to that in Frost, lends substantial support to the position taken by
the Second Circuit.
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